Idealisme transendental
Idealisme transendental adalah sistem filsafat[1] yang diformulasikan oleh filsuf Jerman Immanuel Kant pada abad ke-18. Perspektif epistemologis Kant[2] terdapat dalam bukunya Critique of Pure Reason (1781). Yang dimaksud dengan transendental, menurut Kant, adalah bahwa pendekatan filosofisnya terhadap pengetahuan melampaui pertimbangan yang didasarkan pada bukti-bukti indrawi dan memerlukan pemahaman tentang cara pikiran memproses bukti-bukti indrawi tersebut.[3][4]
Referensi
- ^ Kant, Immanuel (1996) [First edition originally published in 1781; second edition originally published in 1787]. "Introduction by Patricia Kitcher, 3. Transcendental Aesthetic: The Science of Sensory Perception, B. Space, Time, and Mathematics". Critique of Pure Reason. Diterjemahkan oleh Pluhar, Werner S. (edisi ke-Unified Edition with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. hlm. xxxvi. ISBN 0-87220-257-7.
This is one of the first conclusions of "transcendental idealism," Kant's own name for his philosophical system, and we need to pause to consider it carefully to avoid some standard misunderstandings.
- ^ Kant, Immanuel (1996) [First edition originally published in 1781; second edition originally published in 1787]. "Introduction by Patricia Kitcher, 2. Prefaces and Introduction: Kant's Central Problem". Critique of Pure Reason. Diterjemahkan oleh Pluhar, Werner S. (edisi ke-Unified Edition with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. hlm. l. ISBN 0-87220-257-7.
Kant prefaces the ‘’Critique’’ with a lament about the sad state of metaphysics. But his program for reform is thoroughly epistemological. It is only by working our way to a better understanding of the sources and limits of human knowledge that we will be able to figure out what metaphysical questions can fruitfully be asked.
- ^ Kant, Immanuel (1996) [First edition originally published in 1781; second edition originally published in 1787]. "Introduction by Patricia Kitcher, 2. Prefaces and Introduction: Kant's Central Problem". Critique of Pure Reason. Diterjemahkan oleh Pluhar, Werner S. (edisi ke-Unified Edition with all variants from the 1781 and 1787 editions). Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. hlm. l. ISBN 0-87220-257-7.
Because of the unusual nature of his enterprise, Kant gave it a special name: “transcendental” philosophy. The goal of transcendental philosophy is to investigate the necessary conditions for knowledge with a view to showing that some of those necessary conditions are a priori, universal and necessary features of our knowledge, that derive from the mind’s own ways of dealing with the data of the senses. The term “transcendental” has often been a source of confusion, because it includes three not obviously related ideas: (1) the idea that some conditions are necessary for knowledge and (2) the idea that some claims are a priori, in stating necessary and universal features of the world, and (3) the idea that some features of our knowledge are a priori, in the sense that they do not derive from sensory evidence, but from our minds’ ways of dealing with sensory evidence. What is distinctive about Kant’s philosophy is his belief that some of the necessary conditions for knowledge are also a priori, in all four sense of that term: they are universal, necessary, cannot be established by sensory experience, and reflect the mind’s ways of dealing with sensory experience; the term “transcendental” constantly draws attention to that complex doctrine.
- ^ Durant, Will (1933). "VI. Immanuel Kant and German Idealism, III. The Critique of Pure Reason, 1. Transcendental Esthetic". The Story of Philosophy. New York: Simon & Schuster (dipublikasikan tanggal 1953). hlm. 267.
The effort to answer this question, to study the inherent structure of the mind, or the innate laws of thought, is what Kant calls “transcendental philosophy,” because it is a problem transcending sense experience. “I call knowledge transcendental which is occupied not so much with objects, as with ‘’á priori’’ concepts of objects.”—with our modes of correlating our experience into knowledge.
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